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GREATER YELLOWSTONE COALITION V FLOWERS: CLEARING
THE IRREPARABLE HARM HURDLE IN THE TENTH
CIRCUIT TO PROTECT YELLOWSTONE BALD EAGLES
I. INTRODUCTION
The bald eagle has served as the United States' national em-
blem since 1782.1 The country's founders chose the bald eagle to
represent their nation because they believed it signified strength,
majesty and freedom. 2 Today, the bald eagle appears not only on
The Great Seal of the United States, but also on much of its cur-
rency, stamps and state seals. 3
Known in the scientific community as Haliaeetus leucocephalus
(sea eagle with white head), the bald eagle is the only sea eagle
species native to North America. 4 Bald eagles live in aquatic ecosys-
tems, usually nesting in trees near water in remote areas free of
disturbance.5 Additionally, bald eagles tend to use the same nest-
ing area, and often the same nest, for years at a time.6 Their nest-
ing season lasts approximately six months.7 Bald eagles are most
sensitive to human disturbance during the nest building and incu-
1. See Hope Rutledge, The Bald Eagle - An American Emblem, at http://www.
baldeagleinfo.com/eagle/eagle9.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) [hereinafter
American Emblem] (explaining bald eagle was not officially adopted as national em-
blem until 1787 after many states used bald eagle in their coats of arms).
2. See id. (discussing why bald eagle was chosen as United States' national em-
blem); see generally Hope Rutledge, American Bald Eagle Information, at http://www.
baldeagleinfo.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Bald Eagle Info] (discuss-
ing bald eagle in general).
3. See American Emblem, supra note 1 (discussing adoption of bald eagle as
United States' national emblem). However, the choice was not unanimous. Id.
Benjamin Franklin, in fact, characterized the bald eagle as dishonest, lazy and cow-
ardly and suggested that the turkey was a much more appropriate national em-
blem. See id.
4. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Rule To Re-
move the Bald Eagle in the Lower 48 States From the List of Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,454 (proposed July 6, 1999) (to be codified
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) [hereinafter Bald Eagle Proposal] (noting bald eagle ranges
throughout North American continent from Florida to Mexico to Labrador to
Alaska).
5. See id. (adding eagles occasionally nest on cliffs and rarely on ground).
6. See id. (describing 35-year old nest at Vermilion, Ohio).
7. See id. (describing nesting season). See also Hope Rutledge, Bald Eagle -Nest-
ing & Young, at http://www.baldeagleinfo.com/eagle/eagle4.html (last visited
Apr. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Nesting & Young] (describing bald eagle nesting cycle).
(435)
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bation stages of the nesting cycle. 8 Young bald eagles usually stay
near their nest as they learn to hunt and eventually leave when they
are fifteen to twenty weeks old.9
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), the Bald and Golden
Eagle Protection Act (BEPA), and the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) all currently protect the bald eagle.10 Formerly listed as an
endangered species under the ESA, the bald eagle has since been
downgraded to a threatened species.11 In 1999, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) proposed to completely remove the bald ea-
gle from the ESA's "endangered or threatened" species list.12 FWS
has delayed removal from the list until it can determine the best
way to manage the species once off the list.1 3
This Note examines the recent decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Greater Yellowstone Coali-
8. See WASHINGTON DEP'T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, Bald Eagle Nesting & Wintering
Cycle, Washington State, at http://www.wdfw.wa.gov/viewing/wildcam/eaglecam/
graphics/chart2.jpg (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) (charting bald eagle disturbance
sensitivity during nesting cycle of nest building, incubation, nesting and adults/
young/wintering stages). See also Nesting & Young, supra note 7 ("Human distur-
bance can have an impact on the bald eagle, as most of them need some privacy
and quiet to breed.").
9. See id. (noting benefit of communal gatherings of bald eagle nesting areas);
see also Bald Eagle Proposal, supra note 4, at 36,454-55 (discussing bald eagle nest-
ing cycle).
10. See Bald Eagle Info, supra note 2; Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703
(2001) (prohibiting taking, killing, possession, transportation and importation of
migratory birds, or their eggs, parts or nests, unless specifically authorized by De-
partment of Interior); Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668
(2001) (prohibiting taking, possessing, transporting, exporting, importing, bar-
tering, or offering to sell, purchase, or barter bald or golden eagle, or eggs, parts,
or nests, unless under certain specific conditions); Endangered Species Act of
1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2001) (stating purpose to conserve and protect endan-
gered species and their ecosystems).
11. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2003) (listing
bald eagle as threatened species throughout lower 48 states); see also Bald Eagle Info,
supra note 2 (describing protection of bald eagles under MBTA, BEPA and ESA).
12. See Bald Eagle Proposal, supra note 4, at 36,454 (suggesting available data
indicates bald eagle species has recovered). The proposal to remove the bald ea-
gle from the list is due in part to habitat protection and management actions
under ESA, and the reduced presence of certain pesticides in the environment.
See id.; see also Hope Rutledge, The American Bald Eagle - Re-introduction, at http://
www.baldeagleinfo.com/eagle/future.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) [hereinafter
Future] (discussing bald eagle reintroduction programs); U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE
SERVICE, The Bald Eagle is Back! President Clinton announces Proposal to Remove Our
National Symbol From Endangered Species List, available at http://www.fws.gov/
r9extaff/eaglejuly2.html (July 2, 1999) [hereinafter Removal] (announcing FWS's
decision to remove bald eagles from ESA list of "endangered or threatened"
species).
13. See Future, supra note 15 (discussing proposed rule removing bald eagle
from endangered species list).
[Vol. XV: p. 435
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tion v. Flowers.14 In Yellowstone, the Tenth Circuit held that a party
seeking a preliminary injunction against actions threatening bald
eagles need not show damage to the entire species. 15 Further, the
court held that the plaintiffs need only show a significant risk of
harm to those affected bald eagles. 16 Part II of this Note discusses
the relevant factual and procedural history of Yellowstone. 17 Part III
sets forth the legal framework within which Yellowstone was de-
cided. 18 Part V then explains the Tenth Circuit's rationale in
reaching its decision. 19 Next, Part V scrutinizes the court's reason-
ing.20 Finally, Part VI explores the potential effect that Yellowstone
may have on subsequent environmental litigation.
2 1
II. FACTS
A. Canyon Club's March Proposal
In March 2001, Richard Edgcomb, president and general man-
ager of Canyon Club, Inc. (Canyon Club), submitted a proposal to
the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) for a permit under sec-
tion 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA) to build a golf course and
residential development in Teton County, Wyoming.2 2 The land,
bordered by the Snake River, is currently home to three bald eagle
nesting sites: the Cabin Creek nest, the Dog Creek nest and the
14. 321 F.3d 1250, 1258, 1261 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding party seeking prelim-
inary injunction need not show damage to entire bald eagle species, but need only
show significant risk of harm to individually threatened bald eagles).
15. See id. at 1258, 1261 (discussing court's holding).
16. See id. (finding developers' actions posed significant risk of harm to bald
eagles in Canyon Club territory).
17. For a discussion of the facts of Yellowstone, see infra notes 22-51 and accom-
panying text.
18. For a discussion of the pertinent statutory history and case law influencing
the Yellowstone decision, see infra notes 52-101 and accompanying text.
19. For an explanation of the Court's rationale, see infra notes 102-142 and
accompanying text.
20. For a critical analysis of the Court's rationale, see infra notes 143-181 and
accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the impact of the Yellowstone decision, see infra notes
182-196 and accompanying text.
22. See Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1252-53 (10th
Cir. 2003) (explaining developers were required to obtain permit under section
404 of CWA because project required dredging and filling of wetlands and waters
under Corps' jurisdiction); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2001) (describing CWA
permit requirements). The parcel was originally part of the River Bend Ranch
which was sold to the Canyon Club by Richard Edgcomb, the president and gen-
eral manager of Canyon Club. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1252 (explaining east and
south border of parcel consists of national forest land).
4372004]
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Martin Creek nest.23 The Cabin Creek nest has recently been the
most productive nest in the Greater Yellowstone ecosystem. 24 Be-
tween 1992 and 2002, it produced eleven bald eagle fledglings.25 In
addition, the Dog Creek nest has produced at least one fledgling
per year since 1992.26 The Martin Creek nest has been inactive for
the past few years. 27
B. Canyon Club's October Proposal
When several state and federal agencies and environmental
groups criticized the Canyon Club's March proposal, the Corps rec-
ommended that Canyon Club submit a revised proposal.28 That
proposal, submitted in October of 2001, made several changes to
comply with Teton County Land Development Regulations.29
These changes included moving two proposed golf holes off a pe-
ninsula, reducing impacts on wetlands and redesigning proposed
conservation easements.3 0 Subsequently, multiple parties created
several reports assessing the potential environmental impacts of the
23. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d. at 1252-53 (describing three bald eagle nesting sites
within Cabin Creek vicinity). A fourth nest at Elbow Creek lies less than three
miles from the proposed development site, but plaintiffs did not allege any risk of
harm to this site. See id. at 1253 n.3.
24. See id. (describing three bald eagle nesting sites within Cabin Creek
vicinity).
25. See id. (explaining Cabin Creek nest, located 1,475 feet south of one pro-
posed tee box, also maintains alternate nesting site close to development); see also
Nesting & Young, supra note 7 (defining "fledglings" as young eagles that have ac-
quired feathers necessary for flight).
26. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d. at 1252-53 (describing three bald eagle nesting sites
within Cabin Creek vicinity).
27. See id. (explaining Dog Creek nest is located approximately 1,000 feet
from one proposed golf hole while Martin Creek nest is set 230 feet from another
proposed golf green).
28. See id. (explaining areas of controversy included failure to comply with
Teton County Land Development Regulations and impacts to wetlands); see gener-
ally Teton County - Planning and Development Website, at http://clerkl.state.wy.us/
plan (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) (requiring that all development in Teton County
meet requirements of county land development regulations); Jackson/Teton County
Comprehensive Plan & Land Development Regulations, at http://clerkl.state.wy.us/
plan/nav/100141.shtm (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) (establishing goals and require-
ments of land development in Teton County).
29. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1252-53 (discussing changes made to address criti-
cism of March proposal).
30. Id. (discussing changes in project suggested in October proposal). The
new proposal also increased the number of homes on the site to sixty-six and in-
creased the overall size of the area to 359 acres. Id.
4
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proposed development site.3 1 The reports also evaluated the feasi-
bility of alternatives to the October proposal. 32
C. Agency Ecological Reports
1. Pioneer's Biological and Environmental Assessments
Canyon Club retained Pioneer Environmental Services, Inc.
(Pioneer) to prepare a Biological Assessment (BA) of the proposed
development.33 This report examined the proposed development's
possible impacts on several species and found that it was "likely to
adversely affect bald eagles. '3 4 Pioneer then prepared an analysis
under section 404(b) (1) of the CWA (404 Analysis), comparing the
October proposal to five alternatives. 35 In March 2002, Pioneer
prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) comparing the Octo-
ber proposal to each of the alternatives listed in its 404 Analysis.36
Pioneer determined that no alternative to the October proposal
would both satisfy the project's goals and comply with local land
regulations.3 7
31. See id. at 1253-55 (describing Biological Assessment, Section 404(b)(1)
Analysis, and Environmental Assessment prepared by Canyon Club; Biological
Opinion prepared by Fish and Wildlife Service; and Environmental Assessment
prepared by Corps).
32. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1253-55 (describing various environmental re-
ports). For a discussion of the reports, see infra notes 33-44 and accompanying
text.
33. Id. at 1253-54 (discussing Pioneer's biological assessment). Section 7(c)
of the ESA requires the creation of an assessment identifying those endangered or
threatened species likely to be affected by action in areas where such species may
be present. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1) (2001)
(describing requirements of biological assessment). For a further discussion of the
ESA, see supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
34. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1253 (noting Pioneer also determined that pro-
posed project was not likely to affect species other than bald eagles).
35. Id. at 1254 (listing five alternatives: March proposal, nine-hole golf course,
design relocating holes three and four, denial of permit and "no action" alterna-
tive). For a discussion of CWA, see infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
36. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1254 (noting considered alternatives did not in-
clude denial of permit alternative). Federal agencies are required, under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969, to create an environmental assessment to
determine whether a proposed action will significantly affect the "quality of the
human environment." See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C) (2001); see also When to prepare an environmental assessment, 40
C.F.R. § 1501.3 (2003). For a further discussion of NEPA, see supra notes 59-66
and accompanying text.
37. Id. at 1253-54 (listing several project goals). These project goals included
supplementing ranch operations on adjacent property with income from Canyon
Club, developing a world-class 18-hole championship golf course with exceptional
visual experiences and varied play, minimizing development sprawl and preserving
the scenic quality of the environment, and minimizing tree removal, wetland im-
pacts and ground disturbance while conserving open space. Id.
2004] 439
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2. Fish and Wildlife Service's Biological Opinion
In April 2002, FWS prepared its own Biological Opinion
(Opinion), determining it was likely that the proposed project
would only adversely affect bald eagles. 38 FWS predicted that the
proposed action would result in the loss of the Cabin, Dog and Mar-
tin Creek nesting territories, destroying the reproductive output of
six adult bald eagles.39 FWS, however, maintained that the project
would not jeopardize the continued existence of the bald eagle spe-
cies as a whole.40
3. The Corps' Environmental Assessment
The Corps prepared its own EA, rejecting the alternatives that
Pioneer suggested. 4' The Corps concluded that, compared to the
other alternatives, the October proposal posed the slightest envi-
ronmental threat.42 Determining that the project would not signifi-
cantly impact the quality of the human environment, the Corps
then issued a Finding of No Significant Impact.43 As a consequence
of this finding, the Corps declined to issue an Environmental Im-
38. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1254 (explaining FWS' determination that in-
creased human disturbance would make foraging habitat less suitable for bald ea-
gles, but conceding that some bald eagles could become tolerant of some human
activity along Snake River). Section 7(b) of the ESA requires a written opinion to
be prepared, summarizing the possible effects that a federal action will have on
endangered or threatened species and their critical habitats. See Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (3) (2001). For a further discussion of the
ESA, see supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
39. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1254 (suggesting that reproductive output of six
bald eagles would be lost when bald eagles move from Canyon Club nests to terri-
tory already occupied by other bald eagles).
40. Id. (noting FWS did recommend that Canyon Club act in attempt to miti-
gate incidental take that proposed action might cause); see Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B),(G) (2001) (prohibiting unauthorized "take" of
listed species).
41. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1255 (explaining Corps determined that these al-
ternatives, as well as two off-site alternatives, were unsatisfactory because they failed
to meet project goals, violated Teton County Land Development Regulations, were
too expensive or would have unacceptable adverse impact on wetlands).
42. Id. (discussing Corps' consideration of relative environmental threats of
various alternatives).
43. Id. (discussing Corps' decision to issue Finding of No Significant Impact).
See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, 4332(C)
(2001) [hereinafter NEPA] (requiring preparation of Environmental Impact State-
ment for every major Federal action "significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment"). For a discussion of NEPA, see 56JERRY L. MARSHAW ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATVE LAw: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAw SYsTEM, 160-61 (4th ed. 1998).
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pact Statement under the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA) .4 4
D. Corps' Grant of Section 404 Permit
The Corps granted the section 404 permit on June 14, 2002.
45
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs, Greater Yellowstone Coalition and
Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance, brought suit challenging the
permit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyo-
ming.46 The plaintiffs also sought a temporary restraining order
and a preliminary injunction. 47
The District Court for the District of Wyoming denied the pre-
liminary injunction. 48 The court found that, due to the speculative
nature of the plaintiffs' claims, the plaintiffs demonstrated neither
a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, nor irreparable harm to
the entire species. 49 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed and remanded. 50 The Tenth Circuit held that, to
show irreparable harm, the plaintiffs do not need to allege harm to
44. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1255 (explaining Corps' decision not to issue EIS).
For a further discussion of NEPA, see infta notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
45. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1255 (stating effect of grant was to allow October
proposal to go forward).
46. Id. (stating plaintiffs challenged permit by arguing violations of NEPA and
CWA, and that issuance was arbitrary, capricious and abuse of discretion). See gen-
erally Inside the Greater Yellowstone Coalition, at http://www.greateryellowstone.org/
gyc/inside-gyc.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) (describing Coalition as "nationally
known advocate for the idea that ecosystem level sustainability should guide the
management of the region's public and private lands."); Jackson Hole Conservation
Alliance, at http://www.jhalliance.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) (describing Jack-
son Hole Conservation Alliance as "dedicated to responsible land stewardship in
Jackson Hole, Wyoming, to ensure that human activities are in harmony with the
area's irreplaceable wildlife, scenic and other natural resources.").
47. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1255 (discussing procedural posture of case).
48. Id. at 1255-56 (discussing district court's denial of preliminary
injunction).
49. Id. at 1255 (explaining court had originally issued temporary restraining
order, but later amended order to allow limited construction pending decision on
preliminary injunction). After a hearing, the district court lifted the temporary
restraining order and later denied the motion for preliminary injunction. Id.
50. Id. at 1262 (instructing district court to consider remaining elements of
preliminary injunction on remand) (quoting Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1111
(10th Cir. 2002)). The remaining elements include the balance of harms
presented and the effect on the public interest. Id. If those factors favor the plain-
tiffs, the court must inquire whether the plaintiffs' claims "are so serious, substan-
tial, difficult, and doubtful as to make the issue ripe for litigation and deserving of
more deliberate investigation." Id. The Tenth Circuit also noted that if the plain-
tiffs fail to meet the above test, the district court must consider the likelihood of
success on the merits under the different standards of both of the NEPA and CWA
claims. Id. at 1262, n.12.
2004]
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the whole species, but only need to show a significant risk of harm
to those threatened bald eagles.5 1
III. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
1. Clean Water Act
Section 404 of the CWA requires developers to obtain a permit
from the Secretary of the Army Corps of Engineers "for the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters" of the
United States. 52 The CWA prohibits such discharge in several in-
stances.53 First, discharge is prohibited if a practicable alternative
exists. 54 An alternative is practicable if it is feasible in terms of cost,
existing technology and logistics. 5 5 Additionally, the alternative
must be less damaging to the aquatic ecosystem and may not other-
wise significantly harm the environment. 56 Second, discharge of
dredged or fill material is prohibited if it violates any applicable
toxic effluent standard or prohibition under section 307 of the
CWA or any state water quality standard.5 7 Third, such discharge is
prohibited if it threatens to destroy any species listed as endangered
or threatened, or any critical habitat, as defined by the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 (ESA).58
51. Id. at 1258, 1261 (finding developers' actions posed significant risk of
harm to bald eagles in Canyon Club territory).
52. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2001) (requiring publication of notice and opportu-
nity for public hearings); see also id. § 1344(c) (authorizing Administrator of EPA
to prohibit specification of any defined area as disposal site upon determination,
after notice and opportunity for public hearings and consultation with Secretary of
Corps, that such discharge would adversely affect municipal water supplies, shell-
fish beds, fishery areas, wildlife or recreational areas).
53. See generally id. § 1344; see also Section 404(B) (1) Guidelines for Specifica-
tion of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material, 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (2003) [here-
inafter 404 Guidelines] (discussing restrictions on discharge of dredged or fill
material).
54. 404 Guidelines, supra note 53 (discussing situations in which discharge of
dredged or fill material is prohibited).
55. See 404 Guidelines, supra note 53 (stating area not presently owned by
applicant, if otherwise practicable alternative, may be considered if reasonably
available to fulfill basic purpose of proposed activity).
56. Id. (noting practicable alternatives may include activities which do not in-
volve discharge of dredged or fill material into U.S. waters or ocean waters, or
discharges at other locations in U.S. waters or ocean waters).
57. See 404 Guidelines, supra note 53, at (b)(1)-(2) (noting dilution and dis-
persion must be considered when determining cause or contribution to state water
quality standards).
58. See 404 Guidelines, supra note 53, at (b) (3) (noting exemptions granted
by Endangered Species Committee shall apply).
8
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2. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
Congress enacted NEPA to reduce damage to the environ-
ment, to promote environmental awareness and to establish a
Council on Environmental Quality.59 NEPA requires federal agen-
cies to consider alternatives to certain proposed actions that would
affect the environment. 60 Such agencies must issue an Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS) for any federal action "significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment. '"61 To determine
whether an EIS is necessary, the agency must first prepare an Envi-
ronmental Assessment (EA).62 The agency must support the EA
and its determination with sufficient evidence and analysis. 63
NEPA's requirements are procedural in nature and demand that
decisions under NEPA are based on relevant information. 64 If the
agency determines in its EA investigation that the proposed action
will not significantly affect the quality of the human environment,
then it must issue a formal "Finding of No Significant Impact,"
rather than an EIS. 65 Lastly, an agency decision not to prepare an
EIS under NEPA is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act's
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. 66
59. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2001) (discussing Congressional declaration of national
policy encouraging "productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment.")
60. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (2001) (listing one of requirements for Federal
agencies).
61. Id. § 4332(2)(C) (requiring that responsible Federal official consult with
any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise regarding
action involved before issuing any detailed statement).
62. See When to prepare an environmental assessment, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3
(2003) (noting assessment is unnecessary if agency prepares environmental impact
statement).
63. See id. § 1508.9(b) (stating environmental assessment "shall include brief
discussions of the need for the proposal, of alternatives... of the environmental
impacts of the proposed action and alternatives, and a listing of agencies and per-
sons consulted").
64. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
227-28 (1980) (per curiam) (requiring that environmental effects of proposed ac-
tion be adequately identified and evaluated) (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).
65. See 40 C.F.R. 1508.13 (noting "finding of no significant impact" document
must include, at least, summary of environmental assessment and note any other
related documents).
66. See Sierra Club v. Martin, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1312 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (cit-
ing State of North Carolina v. Federal Aviation Admin., 957 F.2d 1125, 1128 (4th Cir.
1992)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2001) (discussing standard of review for federal
agency decisions).
2004]
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3. Endangered Species Act of 1973
The ESA prohibits the unauthorized "take" of any species listed
as endangered under the Act.67 The ESA defines the term "take" as
"harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect" or attempt to do so. 68 In addition, section 7(a) (2) of the
ESA requires federal agencies to take steps to ensure that any action
it authorizes is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered species or destroy or harm its habitat.69 As part of
this mandate, the ESA requires the creation of a written biological
opinion summarizing the possible effects of the federal action on
local endangered or threatened species and their critical habitats. 7
0
B. Burden for Preliminary Injunction
In the Tenth Circuit, a party must show four elements to suc-
cessfully obtain a preliminary injunction: "(1) a substantial likeli-
hood of prevailing on the merits; (2) irreparable harm unless the
injunction is issued; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the
harm that the preliminary injunction may cause the opposing party;
and (4) that the injunction, if issued, will not adversely affect the
public interest."71 The Tenth Circuit modifies this test where the
party seeking relief can set forth a strong showing of the last three
elements.72 If such a showing is made, the likelihood of prevailing
on the merits element may be satisfied by establishing that there is
enough controversy to make the issue ripe for litigation. 73
67. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (B), (G) (2001) (prohibiting unauthorized tak-
ing of species listed under ESA).
68. See id. at § 1532(19) (providing definition of "take" under ESA).
69. Id. § 1536(a) (2) (setting forth requirements for federal action affecting
environment); see also Bays'Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F. Supp. 102 (D. Mass. 1993).
70. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3) (2001) (dis-
cussing requirements of biological opinion).
71. Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Fed. Lands Legal Consortium ex rel. Robart Estate v. United States, 195
F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 1999)).
72. Id. at 1255-56 (explaining available exceptions requiring lower standard
of proof for preliminary injunction) (quoting Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1111
(10th Cir. 2002)).
73. Id. at 1256; see also Davis, 302 F.3d at 1111 (explaining that success on
merits may be satisfied by showing that questions going to merits are "so serious,
substantial, difficult, and doubtful as to make the issue ripe for litigation and de-
serving of more deliberate investigation") (quoting Fed. Lands Legal Consortium, 195
F.3d at 1194-95).
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C. Irreparable Harm Requirement
1. Necessary Level of Harm to Species
a. Old Trend: Necessary to Show Harm to Species as a Whole
The plaintiffs in Fund for Animals v. FizzelF4 sought a prelimi-
nary injunction challenging FWS regulations permitting hunting of
the greater snow goose and Atlantic brant in specific areas.75 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a
party must show that the action would "irretrievably damage" the
species as a whole.76 Both species of birds were once severely un-
derpopulated, but they have enjoyed significant population in-
creases in recent years.77 The court found that properly regulated
hunting would not threaten the bird populations, and thus it posed
no threat of irreparable harm to the species. 78 Additionally, the
court noted that allowing the loss of a small number of abundant
game birds to satisfy the irreparable harm standard would ignore
the requirement's plain meaning.79 According to the court, plain-
tiffs "made only nonspecific claims of 'the destruction and loss of
wildlife,"' and the EIS and EAs suggested no such irreparable
injury.80
Considering a request for a preliminary injunction in Bays' Le-
gal Fund v. Browner,81 the District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts ruled that plaintiffs may use evidence of irreparable harm to
support a claim under the ESA.82 In that case, plaintiffs sought a
preliminary injunction barring the continued construction of a mu-
nicipal sewage discharge tunnel.83 The plaintiffs made additional
claims based on the ESA, NEPA and the Marine Mammal Protec-
74. 530 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
75. Id. at 987 (affirming district court's denial of injunction).
76. Id. (finding appellants had not shown sufficient irreparable harm and
such injury was neither presently occurring, nor likely to occur).
77. Id. at 983-84 (explaining while populations of greater snow goose and the
Atlantic brant had once fallen to 7,000 and 40,700, respectively, greater snow
goose population now approximates 190,000 and Atlantic Brant population ex-
ceeds 120,000).
78. Id. at 986 (noting habitat, not hunting, is primary limiting factor on mi-
gratory bird populations).
79. Fund For Animals v. Frizzell, 530 F.2d 982, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (refusing to
accept plaintiffs assertion that loss of only one bird may be sufficient irreparable
harm to warrant preliminary injunction).
80. Id. (adding regulations providing for suspension of hunting within forty-
eight hours if significant damage to bird population later seems likely to occur).
81. 828 F. Supp. 102 (D. Mass. 1993).
82. Id. at 114 (ruling that federal authorization of construction tunnel did not
violate federal environmental laws).
83. Id. at 104 (discussing plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunction).
2004]
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tion Act (MMPA). 84 The court compared section 7(a) (2) of the
ESA (requiring a showing that the challenged action probably
would adversely affect protected endangered species) to the irrepa-
rable harm standard for a preliminary injunction. 85 Accordingly,
the court treated the plaintiffs' irreparable harm arguments as sup-
port for a claim under section 7(a) (2) of the ESA.86 The district
court held that the evidence presented was insufficient to support
the plaintiffs' ESA claim that the tunnel project was likely to ad-
versely impact endangered species in the bays. 8 7
b. Recent Trend: Unnecessary to Show Harm to Species as a
Whole
More recently, the District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia held that the destruction of certain sensitive or endan-
gered plants and animals and their habitats is sufficient to show
irreparable harm for a preliminary injunction in Sierra Club v. Mar-
tin.88 The plaintiffs in that case sought to enjoin a timber cutting
project affecting over 2,000 acres of national forest land in Geor-
gia.89 The court noted that the logging would destroy several en-
dangered species, as well as certain plants and animals listed by the
United States Forest Service as "sensitive species and their
habitats."90
84. Id. at 105-06, 108 (noting plaintiffs alleged that discharge of nutrients and
toxics from tunnel, as well as noise from ongoing construction, would adversely
impact endangered species protected by ESA). For a discussion of the Endan-
gered Species Act, see supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
85. Id. at 108-10 (discussing alleged violations of section 7(a) (2) of ESA).
The court consolidated plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction with plain-
tiffs' claims under ESA, NEPA and MMPA. Id. at 105.
86. Bays' Legal Fund, 828 F. Supp. at 108 (discussing analogy between ESA
claim and preliminary injunction).
87. Id. at 108-10 (discussing section 7(a) (2) of ESA and ruling for defendant).
88. 71 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (considering plaintiffs' request for
preliminary injunction and holding that defendant's finding that timber sales
would have no impact on plant and animal species was arbitrary and capricious).
89. Id. at 1270-71 (noting challenged action specifically involved projects au-
thorized by United States Forest Service allowing timber cutting, logging, clearcut-
ting, and road building in Georgia's Chattahoochee and Oconee National
Forests).
90. Id. at 1274-75 (noting habitats would prove suitable for several species
which were likely to be found in affected areas). These species included the Pere-
grine Falcon, Green Salamander, Small Whorled Pogonia, American Ginseng,
Turkeybeard, Southern Shrew, Northern Pine Snake, Rafinesque's Big-Eared Bat,
Large Flowered Skullcap, Southern Appalachian Cottontail Rabbit, Common
Raven, Mountain Maple, Red Elderberry, Rosy Twisted Stalk, Fort Mountain
Sedge, Golden Seal, Trispot Darter, Holiday Darter and Blue Shiner. Id.
12
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The court further suggested that irreparable injury should be
judged by the existence of an adequate remedy at law rather than
by its severity.9 1 The court reasoned that if no adequate remedy
existed at law, the injury was irreparable. 92 Noting that no mone-
tary award could remedy the harm alleged, the court found suffi-
cient irreparable harm for a preliminary injunction. 93
2. Significant Risk of Harm Standard is Adequate
The irreparable harm element also requires that the harm al-
leged be more than purely speculative. 94 In Forest City Daly Housing,
Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead,95 the Second Circuit explained that
a Board of Zoning Appeals' denial of a special use permit for con-
structing an assisted living facility would lead to only speculative in-
jury because it would affect only unidentified, future residents. 96
Likewise, in Wisconsin Gas Company v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission,97 (FERC), the D.C. Circuit found an allegation that an
FERC order may result in a loss of supply to customers was purely
speculative because the claim was not supported by any evidence
indicating any supplier's intention to cease contracting. 98
Several circuits, however, recognize the significant risk stan-
dard for showing irreparable harm. 99 These cases demonstrate that
91. Id. at 1327 (noting gravity of injury is irrelevant to determining irrepara-
ble harm).
92. Martin, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1327 (noting injury is irreparable only if it can-
not be remedied through monetary damages) (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter v.
Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990)); see also Sampson v. Murray, 415
U.S. 61, 90 (1974) ("The possibility that adequate compensatory or other correc-
tive relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation,
weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm."). Id.
93. Martin, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1327 (finding no adequate remedy at law for
alleged injuries).
94. Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th Cir. 2003)
(noting that purely speculative harm does not fulfill irreparable injury
requirement).
95. 175 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (denying developer's motion for preliminary
injunction).
96. Id. at 153 (adding that only other harm alleged would be to facility's de-
veloper and would, therefore, be purely economic).
97. 758 F.2d 669, 674-75 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (denying motion for stay of FERC
orders).
98. Id. at 675 (noting that, even if realized, resulting harm would merely be
economic and would not warrant preliminary injunction).
99. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1258 (discussing significant risk of harm stan-
dard for irreparable injury); see also Gonzalez v. Reno, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 7025
(11th Cir. 2000) (granting injunction where plaintiff's removal from U.S.
presented "significant risk of irreparable harm" to plaintiff); Adams v. Freedom
Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484-85 (3d Cir. 2000) ("The irreparable harm require-
ment is met if a plaintiff demonstrates a significant risk that he or she will experi-
2004]
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while an injury may not be certain to occur, the injury is not neces-
sarily speculative per se. 10 0 As long as the plaintiff demonstrates a
significant risk of harm, the plaintiff may meet the irreparable
harm element necessary to justify a preliminary injunction. 1 1
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The primary question before the Tenth Circuit in Yellowstone
was whether a party must show damage to an entire species to satisfy
the irreparable harm element of a preliminary injunction. 10 2 In
earlier proceedings, the district court denied the plaintiffs' request
for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had failed to show
either a likelihood of prevailing on the merits or irreparable
harm. 10 3 Relying on Fund for Animals and Bays' Legal Fund, the dis-
trict court held that a party seeking a preliminary injunction must
demonstrate that a challenged action will irretrievably damage an
entire species in order to satisfy the irreparable harm element.10 4
The district court cited two reasons why the plaintiffs had
failed to show irreparable harm. 0 5 First, the district court found
that the plaintiffs failed to show that the project had put the bald
ence harm .. "); Lanier Prof'l Servs., Inc. v. Ricci, 192 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1999)
(recognizing "significant risk of irreparable harm" as element of preliminary in-
junction); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coalition for Econ. Equity,
950 F.2d 1401, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating plaintiff must show "significant risk of
irreparable harm" in order to satisfy burden for preliminary injunction); Standard
& Poor's Corp., Inc. v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 711 (2d Cir.
1982) (noting "significant risk of irreparable harm to the public supports the pre-
liminary injunction."). Similarly, other circuits recognize a "substantial threat" of
irreparable harm. See Women's Medical Center of Northwest Houston v. Bell, 248
F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing "substantial threat that plaintiff will
suffer irreparable injury" as element of preliminary injunction); Dataphase Sys-
tems, Inc. v. C.L. Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (recognizing
"threat of irreparable harm" as element of preliminary injunction).
100. See Lanier Profl Servs., Inc. v. Ricci, 192 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding
insufficient evidence to support claim of misappropriated documents on which
preliminary injunction claim was based).
101. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1258 (discussing "proposition that purely spec-
ulative harm does not amount to irreparable injury").
102. See id. at 1256 (explaining district court's finding that plaintiffs failed to
show well-being of bald eagle species threatened by challenged action).
103. Id. (noting that because district court found that plaintiffs failed to meet
burden of satisfying first two elements, it need not consider whether threatened
injury outweighed harm that preliminary injunction may cause defendants, or
whether injunction, if issued, would adversely affect public interest).
104. See id. at 1255-56 (reviewing district court's denial of preliminary injunc-
tion under abuse of discretion standard).
105. Id. at 1256 (discussing further reasons for district court's rejection of
preliminary injunction).
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eagle species' continued existence in danger. 10 6 Second, the dis-
trict court found that the injuries alleged were too speculative. 10 7
The Tenth Circuit addressed both parts of the district court's analy-
sis in turn.1
0 8
A. Not Necessary to Show Damage to Entire Species
The Tenth Circuit first rejected the district court's reliance on
Fund for Animals and Bays' Legal Fund.0 9 In Fund for Animals, the
D.C. Circuit stated that to satisfy the irreparable harm requirement
for a preliminary injunction, a party must show that a challenged
action will "irretrievably" damage an entire species.110 The Tenth
Circuit distinguished Fund for Animals, concluding that its holding
was specific to the facts of that case."' The Tenth Circuit stated
that while the birds in Fund for Animals were part of an abundant
game species, the eagles in Yellowstone belonged to a threatened
species." 2 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that the
controversy in Yellowstone concerned the main breeding ground for
bald eagles in the Greater Yellowstone area, which plays a vital role
in sustaining the bald eagle species in that area."1
3
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit determined that Bays' Legal Fund
was inapplicable." 4 In that case, the district court addressed
whether evidence of irreparable harm for a preliminary injunction
could support a claim under the ESA. 1 5 The Tenth Circuit found
that Bays'Legal Fund merely determined that evidence of such harm
106. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1256-58 (explaining element of damage to entire
species).
107. Id. (describing district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' alleged risk of
harm was too speculative).
108. Id. at 1256-61 (addressing district court's analysis).
109. Id. (explaining district court's error in finding damage to twelve juvenile
bald eagles and loss of three bald eagle nests insufficient to warrant preliminary
injunction).
110. Id. (discussing Fund For Animals).
111. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1256-57 (noting in Fund For Animals, species in
question were neither threatened nor endangered).
112. Id. (finding that "threatening or eliminating the primary breeding area
for bald eagles in the Greater Yellowstone area would have a significant impact on
that species in the area.").
113. Compare Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, 530 F.2d 982, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(noting petitioners' argument that loss of only one bird may satisfy burden for
preliminary injunction) with Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1257 (noting that threatening
or destroying important breeding ground would significantly impact area species).
114. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1257 (criticizing analogy between ESA claim and
preliminary injunction).
115. Id. (adding that district court decisions are not binding on circuit
courts).
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may support an ESA claim, which requires a showing that a particu-
lar federal action would jeopardize a species or destroy or otherwise
harm its critical habitat.11 6 The Tenth Circuit explained that the
district court in Bays' Legal Fund did not consider the preliminary
injunction claim, but instead ruled on the merits of the case.1 17
Because the plaintiffs did not base their claim on the ESA, the
Tenth Circuit rejected the contention that the ESA's language
should govern the issue of irreparable harm."18 The court noted
that here, the plaintiffs based their claim in part on the CWA,
which focuses on harm to the "aquatic ecosystem."" 9 The court
also recognized the plaintiffs' contention that eliminating bald ea-
gles from the area in question would surely adversely affect the
aquatic ecosystem because of the importance of bald eagles, and
the Cabin Creek nest, in particular, to the Greater Yellowstone
area.' 20 The Tenth Circuit found further support in Sierra Club v.
Martin, in which the District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia found irreparable harm where a logging operation would
destroy certain sensitive or endangered plants and animals and
their habitats.12' Thus, the court concluded that it was unnecessary
to demonstrate harm to an entire species to meet the irreparable
harm requirement. 22
B. Sufficient to Show Significant Risk of Harm
The Tenth Circuit then addressed the district court's decision
that the harm alleged was purely speculative and, thus, insufficient
to show irreparable injury.123 While the Tenth Circuit agreed with
the district court that purely speculative harm does not equate to
irreparable harm, it nonetheless held that a plaintiff who demon-
116. Id. (discussing finding in Bays' Legal Fund). For a discussion of the En-
dangered Species Act, see supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
117. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1257 (rejecting analysis in Bays' Legal Fund).
118. Id. at 1257-58 (noting that CWA focuses on harm to "aquatic ecosystem"
rather than differentiating between harm to individual animals and harm to entire
species).
119. Id. at 1257-58 (rejecting application of ESA standard in this case).
120. See id. at 1258 (analyzing plaintiffs' claim under CWA standard).
121. See Sierra Club v. Martin, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 1999)
(holding destruction of certain sensitive or endangered plants and animals and
their habitats may satisfy burden of irreparable harm for preliminary injunction
purposes); see also Sierra Club v. Norton, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1340 (S.D. Ala.
2002) (suggesting consideration must be given to "individual members of the spe-
cies"); Sierra Club v. Atlanta, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1357-62 (discussing irreparable
harm) (N.D. Ga. 2001); cf Fund for Animals v. Clark, 27 F. Supp. 2d 8, 14 (D.D.C.
1998) (addressing challenge to slaughter of individual bison).
122. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1258 (rejecting district court's analysis).
123. Id. (discussing plaintiffs' failure to show actual harm to species).
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strates a significant risk of irreparable harm may still satisfy the
irreparable harm requirement. 124 Next, the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered whether the plaintiffs had shown such risk, examining: (1) the
Opinion prepared by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), (2) the
Biological Assessment (BA) prepared by Pioneer, and (3) the testi-
mony presented at the preliminary injunction hearing. 125
The court first considered the Opinion issued by FWS. 126 In
the Opinion, FWS predicted the loss of three bald eagle nests due
to the Canyon Club and its construction. 127 The court then ex-
amined Pioneer's BA.1 28 First, the court recognized Pioneer's sug-
gestion that it was possible to minimize the adverse effects on bald
eagles.' 29 Next, the court cited Pioneer's ultimate finding that the
proposed development posed numerous potential harms to the
bald eagles.' 30 Finally, the court considered the cumulative impacts
on bald eagles in and around the Canyon Club area. 31
The Tenth Circuit then relied on testimony presented at the
preliminary injunction hearing. 132 Robert J. Oakleaf, a Wyoming
124. See id. ("An 'irreparable harm requirement is met if a plaintiff demon-
strates a significant risk that he or she will experience harm that cannot be com-
pensated after the fact by monetary damages.'") (quoting Adams v. Freedom
Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484-85 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Lanier Prof'l Servs., Inc.
v. Ricci, 192 F.3d 1,3 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting need to show irreparable harm); Asso-
ciated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coalition for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401,
1410 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating plaintiff must show "significant risk of irreparable
harm" to satisfy burden for preliminary injunction); but see Forest City Daly Hous.
v. Town of N. Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that purely
speculative harm is insufficient to show irreparable injury); Wis. Gas Co. v.
F.E.R.C., 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
125. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1258-59 (criticizing district court's failure to
apply "significant risk" standard).
126. See id. (discussing evidence Tenth Circuit considered). For a discussion
of the Opinion prepared by FWS, see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
127. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1258-59 (noting FWS' conclusions that proposed
development "may affect and is likely to adversely affect bald eagles").
128. See id. at 1259 (considering BA prepared by Pioneer). For a further dis-
cussion of the BA prepared by Pioneer, see supra notes 33-37 and accompanying
text.
129. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1259 (explaining that Pioneer recommended
implementing mitigation measures and monitoring efforts).
130. Id. (noting Pioneer's admission that Canyon Club construction would
impose direct effects to bald eagles and their habitats, including disturbances such
as noise, human activities, ground disturbance and tree removal).
131. Id. (explaining Pioneer's contention that increased recreational land use
by Club members, families and guests would result in such cumulative impact).
132. Id. Plaintiffs argued that the district court failed to give deference to the
Opinion prepared by FWS. Id. at 1258 n.10. The court determined that deference
may not have been appropriate here because the claim in this case did not come
up under the ESA, a statute which FWS administers. Id. The court did not decide
whether deference was appropriate because it concluded that the evidence
2004]
17
Sutton: Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Flowers: Clearing the Irreparabl
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
452 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAwJouRNAL [Vol. XV: p. 435
Game and Fish Department biologist, predicted a loss of the three
bald eagle nests near the proposed development site. 133 Oakleaf
testified that it may take anywhere from two to twenty years before
such a loss is realized, but he maintained that the project would
likely harm the bald eagles.' 3 4 Ann Deibert, a FWS biologist, con-
ceded that Canyon Club could still take measures to try and save
the bald eagles.' 3 5 Nevertheless, Deibert continued to support
FWS's prediction that the proposed development would likely de-
stroy three bald eagle nests.' 3 6 Finally, the court referred to the
testimony of Roy Hugie, a wildlife biologist and president of Pio-
neer.' 37 Though Hugie conceded that the project could potentially
harm the bald eagles, he predicted that the bald eagles' chances of
success amidst the development project were strong. 13 8
Having concluded that the proposed development posed a sig-
nificant risk of harm to the bald eagles, the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered whether such harm was likely to occur before the district court
ruled on the merits. 139 The court held that to get the preliminary
injunction, the plaintiffs must allege that the project's construction
presented at the hearing was sufficient to demonstrate a significant risk of harm.
Id.
133. Id. at 1259 (explaining Oakleaf's prediction was based on increased
human activity and removal of significant amount of foraging habitat). Oakleaf
also predicted that the greatest threat would be to the Martin Creek nest, followed
by either the Dog or Cabin Creek nest. Id. In addition, Oakleaf suggested that the
project may also place the Elbow Creek nest in danger. Id.
134. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1259-60 (adding Oakleaf's acknowledgement that
bald eagles, in some instances, may tolerate human activity).
135. Id. at 1260 (stating Deibert testified that 400 meter buffer zone around
nest sites may protect nests, but not foraging areas, which are crucial to successful
breeding, and that FWS' prediction of losing three nest areas was worst-case
scenario).
136. Id. (noting that, despite mitigation measures, Deibert believed that los-
ing three bald eagle nesting territories was likely).
137. Id. (discussing Hugie's testimony). Hugie was a witness called by Canyon
Club. Id.
138. Id. (explaining that Hugie suggested bald eagles could adapt to golf
course and increased activity and that project may even develop stronger food
source than presently exists). Hugie also suggested that course design and other
measures could attempt to control human intrusion effects, pointing to the contin-
ued existence of Elbow nest despite its proximity to a campground. Id. According
to the court, "Hugie conceded under cross-examination that he 'wholly agreed'
with the proposition that implementation of the project 'has the potential to ad-
versely affect bald eagles.'" Id.
139. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1260 (suggesting if trial on merits can be con-
ducted before injury occurs, interlocutory relief would be unnecessary) (quoting
CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2948.1 (2d ed. 1995)).
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would harm bald eagles before, rather than after, its completion. 140
Continuing its analysis, the court found that the construction pro-
cess posed a significant risk to the eagles.14 1 Thus, the Tenth Cir-
cuit in Yellowstone held that a party seeking a preliminary injunction
based on harm to a select group of bald eagles need only show a
significant risk of harm to that group of eagles rather than to the
entire species as a whole. 142
V. CRrrIcAL ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit's analysis in Yellowstone, though it may have
overlooked a few points, seems firmly supported and logically rea-
soned. In finding that a claimant need not establish harm to a spe-
cies as a whole, the court correctly distinguished two seemingly
inapplicable cases from the present case, focusing primarily on the
facts at hand and relying on a more analogous case. 43 Addition-
ally, the Tenth Circuit's adoption and application of the significant
risk of harm standard appears to be in harmony with the current
legal trend.1 44 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit is not bound by de-
cisions from other circuits and is free to use its own discretion
where its circuit's caselaw allows. 145 Finally, the Tenth Circuit's de-
cision demonstrates a policy recognizing the bald eagle's value both
as a productive and important member of the Greater Yellowstone
ecosystem and also its importance to the United States as a symbol
of national heritage.1 46
A. Not Necessary to Show Damage to Entire Species
In reversing the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit
properly concluded that irreparable injury did not require a show-
140. Id. (noting allegations that only completed project would harm bald ea-
gles would be insufficient to justify preliminary injunction before trial court de-
cides on merits of case).
141. Id. (referring to Opinion issued by FWS).
142. Id. at 1257-58. The court held that the district court was incorrect in
relying on the ESA standard, requiring demonstration of damage to the entire
species. Id. at 1261. Because the court found that the plaintiffs showed a signifi-
cant risk of harm to the bald eagles, the court held that the district court abused its
discretion in holding the injury to the bald eagles was too speculative to warrant
preliminary injunctive relief. Id.
143. See id. at 1256 (introducing bases for district court's analysis).
144. See Yellowstone, at 1258-59 (adopting significant risk of harm standard); see
also supra note 104.
145. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1257 (stating Tenth Circuit is not bound by
rulings of district courts).
146. See id. at 1258 (discussing plaintiffs' arguments regarding bald eagles'
importance to Snake River area).
2004]
19
Sutton: Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Flowers: Clearing the Irreparabl
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
454 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XV: p. 435
ing of harm to an entire species because the two cases relied upon
by the district court were inapplicable to this case. 147 Distinguish-
ing Fund for Animals, the Tenth Circuit noted that that case involved
abundant game species. 148 The court pointed out that the bald ea-
gles in Yellowstone, by contrast, were a threatened species under the
ESA.149 Of course, similar to bald eagles, both the greater snow
goose and Atlantic brant were protected until FWS proposed the
regulation to allow hunting to resume. 150 The court may have over-
looked the fact that, like the greater snow goose and Atlantic brant,
the bald eagle species has experienced such a strong population
resurgence in recent years that FWS is moving towards eliminating
them from the ESA list completely.15 '
Regardless of the similarities between the bald eagles in Yellow-
stone and the game birds in Fund for Animals, the type of actions
involved in the two cases seems critical in distinguishing them. 5 2
Fund for Animals centered around the hunting of the greater snow
goose and Atlantic brant while Yellowstone involved damage to the
bald eagles' habitat. 53 Fund for Animals referred to the Final EIS,
which pointed out that habitat, rather than hunting, was the key
factor in determining threat to migratory bird populations. 154 In
that document, the Department of the Interior suggested that, so
long as habitat conditions are adequate, hunting migratory game
birds would not cause long-term population reductions. 155 By con-
trast, damage to a bald eagle's habitat may pose a great threat to the
147. See id. at 1256-58 (discussing Fund for Animals and Bays' Legal Fund and
holding it was abuse of discretion for district court to deny preliminary injunction
based on plaintiffs' failure to establish harm to whole species).
148. Id. at 1256-57; see also Fund for Animals, 530 F.2d at 983 n.2 (citing 1975
FWS wildlife census showing populations of greater snow geese and Atlantic Brant
were approximately 190,000 and 120,000, respectively).
149. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1256 (addressing district court's analysis in Fund
for Animals).
150. See Fund for Animals, 530 F.2d at 983 n.2 (discussing prohibition against
hunting greater snow geese since 1931 when their population was 7,000 and that
hunting of Atlantic Brant was discontinued in 1971 due to two years of poor repro-
duction and depletion by hunting).
151. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
152. Compare Fund for Animals, 530 F.2d at 984 (considering regulations al-
lowing hunting of greater snow goose and Atlantic brant) with Yellowstone, 321 F.3d
at 1256 (considering proposed development project threatening bald eagle nest-
ing territories).
153. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1256-57 (distinguishing facts in Fund for Animals
from those in Yellowstone).
154. Fund for Animals, 530 F.2d at 986 (clarifying actual threat to migratory
bird populations).
155. Id. (explaining regulated harvest typically does not lead to long-term
population reduction).
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species. 156 Thus, even applying the standard articulated by the D.C.
Circuit in Fund for Animals to the facts in Yellowstone, the "destruc-
tion or adverse modification" of three bald eagle nests may in itself
be sufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm to the entire bald
eagle species. 157
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit's analysis of Bays' Legal Fund seems
to indicate that the district court's reliance on that case was mis-
placed. 158 As the Tenth Circuit pointed out, the Massachusetts dis-
trict court in Bays'Legal Fund never directly addressed the plaintiffs'
preliminary injunction claim; instead it ruled on the plaintiffs' ESA
claim. 159 In Bays' Legal Fund, the district court treated plaintiffs'
irreparable harm arguments as support for an ESA claim. 160 The
Tenth Circuit in Yellowstone, however, dealt directly with the prelim-
inary injunction issue. 161 Furthermore, the court recognized that
the plaintiffs did not base its claims on the ESA, but rather on the
CWA, which uses a different standard.1 62
Additionally, Bays' Legal Fund is factually distinguishable from
Yellowstone.163 In Bays'Legal Fund, the plaintiffs voiced concern over
the discharge of nutrients and toxins from the use of the outfall
tunnel.164 The plaintiffs in that case also alluded to the damaging
effects of noise from the tunnel construction on the species in the
bay. 165 Unlike in Yellowstone, however, the plaintiffs in Bays' Legal
Fund failed to substantiate their claims with data from agency envi-
ronmental reports.1 66 In a letter to EPA, the National Marine Fish-
156. See id. (noting habitat is key factor in sustaining migratory bird
populations).
157. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d 1252-53 (discussing bald eagle nesting territories
in Canyon Club project area).
158. Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1257-58 (discussing district court's erroneous ap-
plication of Bays' Legal Fund).
159. See id.; see also Bays'Legal Fund, 828 F. Supp. at 108-09 (analogizing proof
of adverse impact on endangered species requirement under ESA to irreparable
harm standard).
160. See Bays' Legal Fund, 828 F. Supp. at 108 (holding that proof of adverse
impact on endangered species requirement under ESA is analogous to irreparable
harm standard).
161. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1257-58 (rejecting analogy used in Bays'Legal
Fund between ESA standard and irreparable harm).
162. See id. (addressing claim under CWA).
163. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1253-55 (distinguishing facts from those in
Bays' Legal Fund).
164. Bays' Legal Fund, 828 F. Supp. at 108-09 (discussing plaintiffs' allegation
that discharge of nutrients and toxins from tunnel would harm local species).
165. Id. at 109-10 (discussing plaintiffs' allegation that noise from tunnel con-
struction would harm local species).
166. See id. at 108-10 (addressing allegations of discharge of nutrients and
toxins, as well as potential effects of noise on bay species).
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eries Service determined that the tunnel project "will not signifi-
cantly affect" any of the species in the bays. 16 7 BAs prepared by
EPA in 1988 and 1993 also concluded that the project would not
adversely impact the species in the bay area.168
Finally, the analysis in Sierra Club v. Martin seems more applica-
ble to Yellowstone than does that of Fund for Animals or Bays' Legal
Fund.169 Martin, like Yellowstone, involved damage to individual
plants and animals rather than to an entire species. 170 In Martin,
the court found irreparable harm in logging activities that would
destroy certain sensitive plants and animals, as well as areas that
could provide suitable habitats for certain other sensitive and en-
dangered species. 171 Comparing the construction project in Yellow-
stone to the logging project in Martin, the Tenth Circuit properly
determined that establishing harm to an entire species is not neces-
sary to meet the irreparable harm requirement. 172
B. Sufficient to Show Significant Risk of Harm
The Tenth Circuit also correctly applied the significant risk of
harm standard, considering the substantial number of courts that
167. Id. at 106 (discussing NMFS' "tentative conclusion").
168. Id. at 106-07 (discussing EPA's findings).
169. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1257-58 (comparing destruction of certain
sensitive plants and animals in national forest territory to elimination of bald ea-
gles from Greater Yellowstone area).
170. Id. at 1327 (discussing threat to local species).
171. Sierra Club v. Martin, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (continu-
ing that such injury may not be rectified economically, thus adequate remedy does
not exist at law).
172. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1258 (applying reasoning of Martin to reject
ESA standard for determining irreparable harm in a claim based on CWA or
NEPA). Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit chose not to address whether the true
issue should have been the type of harm, as opposed to the necessary level of
harm. Id. As Martin noted, irreparable harm is not dependant on the significance
of the injury, but rather on the type of available remedy. See Martin, 71 F. Supp. 2d
at 1327 (noting injury is "irreparable" only if no adequate remedy at law exists)
(citing Northeastern Florida Chapter v. Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir.
1990)) (stating injury is irreparable only if it cannot be undone through monetary
remedies). Thus, it may be argued that any injury is irreparable if it cannot be
remedied through monetary damages. See id. (explaining when injury may not be
rectified economically, adequate remedy does not exist at law); but see Sampson v.
Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) ("The possibility that adequate compensatory or
other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of
litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm."). In Yellowstone, it
seems clear that the harm to the bald eagles could not have been remedied
through monetary damages. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1253-54 (describing poten-
tial threat to bald eagles). Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit chose not to consider
this argument, despite its reliance on Martin. See id. at 1257 n.8 (discussing
Martin).
22
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol15/iss2/5
BALD EAGLES
recognize and apply this standard. 173 Furthermore, the evidence
the Tenth Circuit considered in finding a significant risk of harm to
the bald eagles seemed to weigh in the plaintiffs' favor. 174 The FWS
Opinion predicted the loss of three bald eagles' nests due to the
Canyon Club's construction. 175 Pioneer's assessments suggested
that there were ways to minimize the adverse effects, but they ulti-
mately acknowledged that the proposed development posed various
potential harms to the bald eagles.1 76
The testimony presented and considered by the Tenth Circuit
at the preliminary injunction hearing also suggested that a signifi-
cant risk of harm threatened the bald eagles.1 77 Robert Oakleaf
predicted a loss of at least three, if not all four, bald eagle nests. 78
Ann Deibert, a FWS biologist, conceded that measures could be
taken to try and save the bald eagles, but she maintained that the
proposed development would likely destroy three bald eagle
nests. 179 Even Roy Hugie, the president of Pioneer, while optimis-
tic about the bald eagles' chances of success amidst the develop-
ment project, conceded that the project created the potential to
harm the bald eagles. 80
Thus, the Tenth Circuit in Yellowstone properly held that a
party seeking a preliminary injunction based on harm to a select
group of bald eagles needs only to show a significant risk of harm to
173. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
174. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1258-61 (considering evidence of harm to bald
eagles in light of significant risk standard).
175. See id. at 1258 (noting FWS' conclusions that proposed development
"may affect and is likely to adversely affect bald eagles"). For a further discussion
of the Opinion prepared by FIS, see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
176. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1259 (noting Pioneer's admission that Canyon
Club construction would impose direct effects to bald eagles and their habitats,
including disturbances such as noise, human activities, ground disturbance and
tree removal). For a further discussion of the BA prepared by Pioneer, see supra
notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
177. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1259-61 (concluding evidence presented at
hearing was sufficient to demonstrate significant risk of harm).
178. See id. at 1259 (explaining Oakleafs prediction was based on increased
human activity and removal of significant amount of foraging habitat). Oakleaf
also predicted that the greatest threat would be to the Martin Creek nest, followed
by either the Dog Creek or Cabin Creek nest. Id.
179. See id. at 1260 (stating Deibert testified that 400 meter buffer zone
around nest sites may protect nests but not foraging areas, and FWS' prediction of
losing three nest areas was "worst-case scenario").
180. See id. (explaining Hugie suggested bald eagles could adapt to environ-
ment and project may even develop stronger food source for eagles than presently
exists). Hugie also suggested that course design and other measures could attempt
to control human intrusion effects, pointing to the continued existence of Elbow
nest despite its proximity to a campground. Id. (noting Hugie conceded under
cross-examination that he agreed project could potentially harm bald eagles).
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that group of eagles rather than show damage to the entire species
as a whole. 81
VI. IMPACT
The Tenth Circuit took advantage of the lack of binding prece-
dent to hand down an environmentally friendly decision in Yellow-
stone.182 The unmentioned fact, that perhaps was considered in the
analysis, was the importance of the bald eagle to both the United
States' ecosystem and its national identity.183 The court appears to
have paved the way for greater protection of the nation's species by
lessening the burden of showing irreparable harm involving actions
concerning a particular group of animals.' 84 Not only did the Yel-
lowstone decision relieve parties from showing that a challenged ac-
tion jeopardizes the continued existence of an entire species, it also
adopted and applied a "significant risk of harm" standard in evalu-
ating the type of harm. 185
Bays' Legal Fund may serve as an example of how the standard
recognized by the Tenth Circuit may be applied.186 Under the stan-
dard articulated in Yellowstone, the court in Bays' Legal Fund may
have been compelled to issue a preliminary injunction. 187 In that
case, as in Yellowstone, a construction project threatened members
of a protected species.' 88 Although the findings related to the al-
leged harm were not sufficient to substantiate the plaintiffs' claims
under the ESA, the alleged threats may have been sufficient to show
a significant risk of harm to the species to warrant a preliminary
injunction under the Yellowstone standard. 89
181. See id. at 1258, 1261 (pointing out district court abused its discretion by
both relying on ESA standard requiring showing of damage to entire species and
by finding injury to bald eagles too speculative).
182. See generally Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1258-61 (finding sufficient risk of
harm to bald eagles to satisfy irreparable harm requirement for preliminary
injunction).
183. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
184. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1258, 1261 (holding party seeking preliminary
injunction based on harm to select group of bald eagles need only show significant
risk of harm to that group of eagles rather than showing damage to entire species).
185. See id. (discussing standard of harm review).
186. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
187. See generally Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F. Supp. 102, 105 (D. Mass.
1993) (consolidating plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunction with formal re-
view of their claims).
188. See id. at 104-05 (introducing facts of case).
189. Compare Bays' Legal Fund, 828 F. Supp. at 105-07 (discussing impact of
tunnel project on local species), with Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1258-61 (discussing
threats to bald eagles posed by construction project).
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The full impact of Yellowstone has yet to be seen. It is important
to note that the nesting territories threatened in Yellowstone were an
integral part of the Greater Yellowstone ecosystem.190 Also, bald
eagles, while no longer endangered, are still listed as "threatened"
under the ESA.' 91 Thus, courts may be likely to distinguish Yellow-
stone in subsequent cases challenging actions that involve harm to a
less sensitive species or affecting a less significant component of a
particular ecosystem.' 92
It is also necessary to recognize that the Yellowstone decision
only considered one element of the preliminary injunction test: the
irreparable harm element.193 In order to obtain a preliminary in-
junction, the plaintiffs must also show that the threatened injury
outweighs any harm it might cause defendants and that the injunc-
tion, if issued, will not adversely affect the public interest.19 4 Fur-
thermore, the plaintiffs must either: (1) show that the issue is ripe
for litigation, or (2) demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits under its NEPA and CWA claims. 195 Nevertheless, in light of
the heavy burden required to justify a preliminary injunction, the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Yellowstone should be considered a vic-
tory for the environment and a significant development in protect-
ing one of the United States' most majestic species.196
Steven Sutton
190. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1253, 1257-58 (discussing productivity of bald
eagle nests in Canyon Club area and their importance to Greater Yellowstone
ecosystem).
191. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (noting bald eagles listed as
"threatened" under ESA though proposal to remove bald eagles from ESA list is
pending).
192. See Yellowstone, 321 F.3d at 1253 (explaining significance of Canyon Club
area bald eagle nests).
193. See id. (framing issues related to irreparable harm).
194. See id. at 1261-62 (noting remaining inquiries are balance of harms and
effect on public interest).
195. See id. (noting ripeness may be satisfied by showing that issues are so
serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful to be deserving of more deliberate
investigation).
196. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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